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AMTRAK'S LEGISLATIVE MANDATE: A TIME
FOR RETHINKING
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, was created by
Congress to reverse the unfortunate decline of the passenger railroad
industry. Initial hopes for a profitable enterprise were unrealized, as
Amtrak drowned in seas of red ink. Subsequent efforts have focused
upon shifting its route structure to increase patronage and reduce sub-
sidy. The most significant of these efforts is the Northeast Corridor
Project, which has attracted a great increase in the number of passen-
gers. It has, however, failed to reduce deficits. This project has demon-
strated that Amtrak can succeed in being an important mode of
transportation if enough money is invested in improving service in ap-
propriate markets. If Amtrak is to have a future, it is in the short-
distance, high-speed "corridor" system, which is presently being devel-
oped in the Northeast. The costs, however, are very high; therefore,
serious study must be given to a determination of which regions of the
country will be best served by the institution of high-speed rail service.
This note will discuss the reasons for the failures of Amtrak, the bene-
fits to the public of a passenger rail system, and the possibility of ex-
tending the corridor concept to other areas of the country.
II. THE DECLINE OF THE PASSENGER TRAIN AND THE
EMERGENCE OF AMTRAK
A. Losses and Subsidies
The American passenger train, once a dominant part of the nation's
transportation scheme, had witnessed a significant decline by the
1960's. Since the end of World War II, the trains lost more and more
passengers each year to airplanes and automobiles. The private rail-
road companies, which transported both passengers and freight, were
experiencing significant losses from their passenger services. The re-
sulting scheme involved a "cross subsidy," under which freight earn-
ings subsidized the operation of passenger trains.' The railroads
responded by discontinuing passenger trains. The discontinuation was
overseen by state railroad commissions, which did not establish uni-
form criteria.
B. Role of the Interstate Commerce Commission
The national scope of the problem prompted Congress to respond
I. G. HILTON, AMTRAK: THE NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION 5 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as HILTON].
Amtrak's Legislative Mandate
in 19582 by giving the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) power
to regulate all discontinuation. The ICC undoubtedly forestalled the
disappearance of passenger trains. Despite the continued unprofitabil-
ity of passenger rail service, the ICC committed the nation to the reten-
tion of at least a skeletal system. It preserved at least one train on every
long distance route,3 forcing the private railroads to absorb the losses.
It advanced legislation promoting stricter discontinuation require-
ments.
The age of the privately owned passenger train had clearly arrived
by the end of the 1960's. The railroads, particularly in the Northeast,
were no longer able to absorb the great losses which were produced by
their passenger services. Congress was again forced to respond.
C. Reasons for the Decline
Two hypotheses had been repeatedly advanced for the decline. The
first, explained by ICC Examiner Hosmer in a 1958 report,4 identified
the public's preference for automobile and airline transportation as the
major cause. Increased costs were attributed to the heavy concentra-
tion of labor required to run the trains. The report reasoned that re-
ductions in fares or improvements in service would be unlikely to
reverse the trend in light of shifting public preference. In forecasting
the imminent demise of the passenger train, the report concluded that
"in a decade or so this time-honored vehicle may take its place in the
transportation museum along with the stagecoach, the side-wheeler,
and the steam locomotive."5
The contrary thesis, known as the "discouragement hypothesis,"
was widely accepted and most vigorously advocated by Peter Lyon.6
According to Lyon, passengers did not merely exercise a preference;
they were "pushed from the trains" by railroad executives, who pre-
ferred to transport more profitable and less troublesome freight. Lyon
pointed to the railroads' failure to advertise or employ any of the crea-
tive marketing techniques pioneered by the airlines. He accused the
railroads of downgrading the quality of service to encourage passengers
to seek other forms of transportation. He declared that the "passen-
ger-service deficit, so-called, is and always has been a statistical mirage;
a fraud; a phony." 9 He proposed the nationalization of the passenger
railroad industry, contending that such a corporation--operated in the
public interest-would be profitable.
2. Id at6.
3. Id at 13.
4. H. Hosmer, Railroad Passenger Train Deficit (ICC Docket No. 31954, 1958), cited in
HILTON, supra note 1, at 9.
5. Id
6. P. LYON, To HELL IN A DAY COACH (1968) [hereinafter cited as LYON).
7. Id at 244-45.
8. Id at 223-76.
9. Id at 246.
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D. The Railroad Passenger Act of 1970
1. Congressional Considerations. As the system in operation at the
end of the 1960's served every region of the country, its preservation
had important political appeal.' 0 Congressional sentiment was divided
between providing direct subsidies to the private railroads to continue
service and creating a federal corporation to operate the trains. The
widely held discouragement hypothesis was most consistent with the
latter option. The preference of John Volpe, Secretary of Transporta-
tion, for such a corporation persuaded Congress to enact the Rail Pas-
senger Service Act of 1970."
2. Corporate Structure. The Act created the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak. It was incorporated in the District
of Columbia as a for-profit corporation."l The private railroads were
to become the common stockholders; preferred stock would be issued
to investors.'3 The railroads were issued stock after paying to the cor-
poration a sum of capital which was based on the amount of loss sus-
tained by operating that service. 14 The amount could be paid in cash,
equipment, or obligations to provide future service. Alternatively, the
railroads could, instead of receiving stock, decide not to join the system
and write off their required contributions as tax losses. Only four rail-
roads chose to become stockholders. 5 A railroad that paid nothing
under either alternative lost its right to discontinue passenger train
service. Only a few railroads exercised this option. Most contributed
by providing equipment, much of which was heavily depreciated. Con-
gress provided a small grant to enable the corporation to begin opera-
tions.
3. Route Plan. The Secretary of Transportation submitted a plan
for the new corporation's route structure. The plan, under which about
half of the then-operating trains would be discontinued, proposed a se-
ries of radials extending outward from Chicago to various distant cities.
The plan also recommended routes from New York to Buffalo, Boston,
Washington, New Orleans, and Miami. One additional route provided
for service between Washington and St. Louis.
Two criticisms of the plan emerged. '6 The first noted that the most
heavily traveled rail networks were in densely populated regions, such
as the Northeast, where cities were only short distances apart. Air
10. HILTON, supra note 1, at 18.
11. Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327 (1970).
12. Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 304, 84 Stat. 1331 (1970) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 544 (1976) (amended
1974)).
13. Id
14. Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 401, 84 Stat. 1334 (1970) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 567 (1976) (amended
1973)).
15. The Burlington Northern, Grand Trunk Western, Milwaukee Road, and Penn Central be-
came shareholders.
16. HILTON, spra note 1, at 18.
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travel was not an alternative for many of these routes because the dis-
tance to the airport was often only a bit shorter than the distance to the
destination city. For example, a plane trip is not a viable option for a
traveler who wishes to journey from downtown Manhattan to Philadel-
phia since it takes almost as much time to get to John F. Kennedy
airport as to travel to Philadelphia. Trains, on the other hand, serve
downtown areas, which remain the business and financial centers of the
Northeastern cities. The same competitive advantage could be culti-
vated in other heavily populated areas, such as along the Chicago-De-
troit route and in Southern California. The proponents of this view
reasoned that Amtrak would be more successful if it exploited the
short-distance markets and left the long-distance routes to the airlines.
The second criticism of the Secretary's plan was that it was not national
enough. For example, it did not call for any north-south service along
the West Coast.
The advocates of the second criticism were ultimately successful.
Several long distance routes were added to the final'route -structure.'
7
The success of this position is easily explained. Amtrak, as a creature
of legislation, is very sensitive to political pressures. To survive politi-
cally, it must serve as many geographic areas of the country as possible.
Instead of concentrating efforts on high-speed service in densely popu-
lated areas, Congress drew the routes to cover as much ground as possi-
ble. Amtrak was simply spread too thinly over areas in which there
was too little demand for service.' 8 The remaining demand was frus-
trated by the fact that most routes offered service by only one train per
day, leaving intermediate points with service only during the middle of
the night. As a result, service facilities and passenger stations were lo-
cated in many remote places, where they would be lightly used and
very expensive.
The political aspect was reflected in many routes. For example,
Senators from Indiana had always been interested in transportation
policy; Indianapolis was initially served by three Amtrak routes.19
West Virginia was the home of several important political figures.2"
The initial plan called for only one train through West Virginia, but a
second was soon added. In January 1979 the Carter Administration
proposed the elimination of all the trains-by then, three-which trav-
elled through West Virgina. Congress kept all three.2' By the summer
of 1979, it became clear that some Amtrak routes would have to be cut.
Congress decided to cut all long-distance trains with fewer than 150
17. The added routes included: Seattle-San Diego, Los Angeles-New Orleans, Norfolk-Cincin-
nati, and St. Louis-Kansas City.
18. HILTON, supra note 1, at 20.
19. Id at 19.
20. These include: Harley 0. Staggers, Jennings Randolph, and Robert C. Byrd. See discussion
in At Las, Amtrak Has a Chance to Highball, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 8, 1979, at 88 [hereinaf-
ter cited as At Last, Amtrak Has a Chance].
21. Id
1981]
Journal of Legislation
passenger-miles per train mile.2 2 But to ensure the retention of service
in key Congressional districts, it added sections to the act which pro-
vided that one train in each quadrant be kept for "regional balance."23
The inevitable political element in these decisions was ultimately quite
wasteful.
Amtrak began operations by contracting with the private railroads
to provide service. Amtrak was not really a railroad at its inception
because it did not own track or operate its trains directly. Under the
usual arrangement, the private railroad would operate the trains over
its tracks. Amtrak owned the trains and provided passenger service
and station pesonnel, while the railroad provided the engine and train
crew.
II. OPERATING EXPERIENCE
A. Financial Experience
Amtrak's brief history has been very controversial. The corporation
has, at least in part, managed to arrest the decline of the passenger
railroad industry. This result has been accomplished, however, by the
infusion of vast sums of tax dollars.
Table 124 shows that the number of travelers has steadily increased
over the years. However, Amtrak has only captured three-tenths of one
percent of all intercity travel in the United States." Present fleet size
22. A passenger-mile figure is a measurement of the load factor of a passenger train. It is ob-
tained by multiplying the number of passengers travelling on a train by the number of miles
they travel.
23. At Last, Amtrak Has a Chance, supra note 20, at 90.
24.
TABLE I
AMTRAK OUTPUT, 1972-1978
Passenger-
Ridership Miles Route-Miles Train-Miles
Year (millions) (millions) (thousands) (millions)
1972 16.6 3,038 23 26
1973 16.9 3,806 22 27
1974 18.8 4,258 24 29
1975 17.4 3,939 26 30
1976 18.6 4,221 26 31
1977 19.2 4,333 26 33
1978 18.9 4,169 26 32
Percentage
increase 13.8 37.2 13.0 18.8
SOURCES: National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Background on Amtrak (1977), p. 27; Am-
trak Annual Report, 1977, p. 24; Amtrak Performance Measure Reports, 1978-1979.
HILTON, supra note 1, at 33.
25. Authorize Appropriations for Amtrak and DOT's Final Route Recommendation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 96th Cong., ist Sess. 29 (1979) (statement of Hon. Brock Adams, Secretary,
D.O.T.) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Amtrak Hearings].
338 [Vol. 8:334
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will not permit substantial improvements in this figure.2 6
The reversal of the decline in patronage has been a result of heavy
public subsidy. Amtrak has, to date, never recovered even half of its
revenues from passenger fares. Amtrak divides its routes into three cat-
egories: long-haul, short-haul and Northeast corridor. Although no
route breaks even,27 the least profitable service is between New York
and Washington. The greatest losses are incurred on the short-haul
routes.
B. Explanation of Financial Situation
Why has Amtrak been such a dismal financial nightmare, recover-
ing less than half of its revenues from the travelling public? A General
Accounting Office (GAO) report2" points to two reasons-the high op-
erating costs and the inability to raise fares without losing passengers
and revenue.
The report demonstrates the extent of Amtrak's inability to recover
its costs. For example, in February 1977 a train on the Milwaukee-
Chicago route had to carry 532 passengers to meet expenses with its
then current fares and costs. The capacity of the train was only 271,
and the average ridership was only 76. Even though the operating costs
amounted to $39 per passenger, the average revenue was only $5.55 per
passenger.
A large portion, approximately 65%, of Amtrak's costs are labor-
based. The report used train number 355 from Chicago to Detroit as
an example. The six-hour train ride required the employment of seven
people. The engine crew consisted of an engineer and a fireman, who
both worked under a controversial union contract specifying that a trip
of 100 miles be considered a full-day's work. The resulting overtime
pay swelled the average yearly salary of an engineer to $30,500 and a
fireman to $27,500. Because the conductor and brakeman worked
under contracts defining 150 miles as a full-day's work, each received
two day's pay for the journey. In 1977 an average brakeman and con-
ductor earned $27,500 and $26,500, respectively. In addition, three on-
board service crew members were employed for the journey. By way of
contrast, an intercity bus only requires the services of one person, the
26. The Department of Transportation's data show that, from 1980 through 1982, filling every
seat in every train would still result in Amtrak handling less than one percent of all intercity
travel. Id at 34.
27. In fiscal year 1977, the average operating cost per passenger-mile throughout the system was
22.34. Only 8.30 were recovered from the passenger, so the remaining 14.04t came from gen-
eral tax revenues. The most unprofitable routes were the short-haul routes (up to 500 miles),
which lost 16.0c per passenger-mile. The long-haul routes (over 500 miles) lost 14.31, and
the northeast corridor (Washington-Boston) lost 12.0 per passenger-mile. The least unprof-
itable service was the New York-Washington Metroliner, which lost 6.2¢ per passenger-mile.
These heavy subsidies make passenger train travel the most heavily subsidized in the coun-
try. HILTON, supra note 1, at 44-45.
28. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, SHOULD AMTRAK DEVELOP HIGH-SPEED CORRIDOR SERV-
ICE OUTSIDE THE NORTHEAST? (CED 78-67) (1978).
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driver. An automobile is driven by the owner without compensation.
In addition to labor costs, Amtrak also incurred expenses for mainte-
nance, fuel, sales and marketing, station services, and the privilege of
using the privately owned tracks.
However, Amtrak is unable to raise its fares and maintain its rider-
ship. Table 229 summarizes the options available to the traveling pub-
lic on the Chicago-Detroit route. The full cost of an automobile
reflects the cost of depreciation, insurance, taxes, repair, fuel, and mis-
cellaneous items. However, most people own a car for general use, so
some of these items-particularly depreciation and taxes-are paid re-
gardless of whether one uses his car for this trip. Most people only take
into account the additional price of fuel and oil in determining the cost
of a trip. Amtrak's fare makes the train ride an attractive option in
some markets. For a family of four, however, the private automobile is
the clear choice.
The GAO report noted that Amtrak had discovered a significant
relationship between frequency of service and patronage.30 In 1975
and 1977 Amtrak increased train frequency on its Los Angeles-San Di-
ego and Chicago-Detroit routes. The number of passengers grew sig-
nificantly, but the total number of unfilled seats also rose. The
operating deficit expanded.
The report also noted that Amtrak had failed, in many of its routes,
to provide reliable on-time service.3' Although late arrivals were usu-
ally caused by poor track and, therefore, were beyond Amtrak's con-
trol, its reputation for habitual lateness hurt its ability to attract
customers. The report concluded 32 that Amtrak had not attracted more
passengers because of its inability to provide frequent, on-time service;
its slow speed; and, most importantly, the attachment Americans have
for their cars. Amtrak would probably never succeed in recovering its
costs, even by providing better service, unless petroleum supplies were
seriously disrupted.
29.
TABLE 2
Fares Auto
Amtrak fare
needed to full marginal
break even Amtrak bus air* cost cost
Chicago-Milwaukee $38.75 6.25 5.50 25.00 14.95 4.25
Chicago-Detroit 29.80 20.30 21.40** 40.00 47.43 13.95
Los Angeles-San Diego 14.45 9.00 8.35 11.45 21.76 6.40
* lowest existing day coach fare
** round trip ticket reduces one-way cost by 5%
Id at 12.
30. Id
31. Id
32. Id
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IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Despite the miserable state of its balance sheet, Amtrak has had
considerable success on Capitol Hill. Congress has seemed willing to
cover Amtrak's losses with greater and greater subsidies. In addition,
Congress has enacted legislation paving the way for an even greater
role in the nation's transportation scheme.
A. Restructuring and Reorganization
The first major change in Amtrak's structure resulted in its meta-
morphosis from an operator of passenger trains to a genuine railroad.
During the reorganization of the bankrupt northeastern railroads into
Conrail under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 197333 and the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 34 Amtrak
acquired the bulk of the Northeast Corridor track.35 Acquisition of this
track swelled its costs by requiring the direct employment of dispatch-
ers, towermen, and train control personnel, whose work had previously
been charged to Amtrak under its contracts with the railroads.
The mounting costs, which translated into ever-increasing deficits,
prompted Congress to enact a series of bills to cover Amtrak's losses.
The National Passenger Railroad Corporation Assistance Act of 197236
enlarged Amtrak's subsidy. The Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973P1
further expanded the subsidy and included provisions to make Amtrak
a permanent venture.38
The Amtrak Improvement Act of 197839 contained favorable and
unfavorable elements. While increasing the subsidy, it directed the
Secretary of Transportation to develop a new route plan. Secretary
Adams' plan favored the discontinuance of service on some 12,000
miles, or forty-three percent of the route. A heated controversy in Con-
gress resulted in a compromise; Amtrak reduced its route mileage
about thirteen percent. 4°
A recent legislative effort, still in effect, is the Amtrak Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1979,4 1 which sets goals for performance and profitability.
A fifty percent improvement in on-time performance within three years
33. Pub. L. No. 94-5, 89 Stat. 7 (1973).
34. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976).
35. From the Penn Central, Amtrak acquired its 456 mile line from Washington to Boston, plus
branches of 62 miles from New Haven, Conn., to Springfield, Mass., and 103 miles from
Philadelphia to Harrisburg-a total of 621 miles of route ranging from two to six tracks. The
corporation also acquired track from Michigan City, Indiana, to Kalamazoo, Michigan.
HILTON, upra note 1, at 27.
36. Pub. L. No. 92-316, 86 Stat. 227 (1972).
37. Pub. L. No. 93-146, 87 Stat. 548 (1973).
38. The Act restricted the voting rights of the railroads on the Board of Directors and added
representatives of consumer groups to the Board. It increased the control of Congress over
Amtrak while reducing the control of the executive branch, particularly the Office of Man-
agement and Budget and the Department of Transportation.
39. Pub. L. No. 95-421, 92 Stat. 923 (1978).
40. HILTON, supra note 1, at 30.
41. Pub. L. No. 96-73, 93 Stat. 537 (1979).
1981]
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is demanded. The implementation of a system-wide average speed of
fifty-five miles per hour (mph) is required within those three years.
Furthermore, the Act directs Amtrak to recover an even greater per-
centage of its losses in future years.42
B. High-Speed Corridors
The Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 198043 addresses the
concept of high-speed rail corridors. It appropriates money for the
completion of the Northeast Corridor Project, the high-speed rail pro-
ject between Boston and Washington. In addition, the Act appropri-
ates money for a study of the feasibility of short-distance, high-speed
rail transportation in thirteen different regions of the country." The
Secretary of Transportation is directed to rank these markets according
to potential for attracting riders, reducing energy consumption, and
providing cost-effective rail transportation service. The Act is signifi-
cant because it demonstrates the awareness, of at least some members
of Congress, that the real potential for passenger trains lies in high-
speed, short-distance service. As Mr. Madigan stated on the floor of
Congress,
We do not believe, in sponsoring this section of the bill, that the future
of rail passenger service lies in long-distance trains. We think the fu-
ture of rail passenger service in the United States lies in short-distance,
high-density routes that people are using and are likely to use in the
future.45
This new emphasis in the direction of Amtrak has undoubtedly re-
sulted from the relative successes of train service offered in the North-
east.
42. The Act instructs Amtrak to recover 44% of its operating expenses by the end of fiscal 1982
and 50% by 1985. It sets limits of avoidable loss to be met by short and long-haul trains.
Trains not meeting the criteria are to be discontinued.
43. Pub. L. No. 96-254, 94 Stat. 399 (1980) (codified at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-658 (West Supp.
1980)).
44. These potential markets are the following routes:
(1) Cincinnati-Chicago
(2) Cleveland-Chicago
(3) Detroit-Chicago
(4) Los Angeles-San Diego
(5) Los Angeles-Las Vegas
(6) Miami-Jacksonville
(7) New York-Buffalo
(8) St. Louis-Chicago
(9) San Jose-Sacramento
(10) Seattle-Portland
(11) Dallas/Ft. Worth-San Antonio-Houston
(12) Minneapolis/St. Paul-Chicago
(13) Washington-Richmond
45. CONG. REC. H2,358 (daily ed. March 31, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Madigan).
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V. THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR
A. Early Efforts
The first successful congressional plan for the revival of the passen-
ger railroad industry was proposed in the early 1960's by Senator Pell
from Rhode Island. His original scheme' envisioned an eight state
public authority that would own and operate a high-speed railroad
service within the densely populated region between Boston and Wash-
ington. The system was to be financed by long-term, tax-exempt bonds
guaranteed by the federal government. His proposals, though not ac-
cepted initially, were widely debated. The Johnson Administration, in
a report to Congress,47 proposed the enactment of legislation appropri-
ating funds to study the feasibility of high-speed rail service in heavily
travelled regions of the country. President Johnson's plan called both
for research into materials, aerodynamics, vehicle power and control,
guideways and for an analysis of travel preferences and potential mar-
kets for high-speed ground transportation. His bill, the High-Speed
Ground Transportation Act,48 appropriated ninety-nine million dollars
for these studies. It gave the Secretary of Commerce, and later the Sec-
retary of Transportation, the authority to conduct demonstration
projects in conjunction with the private railroads. Work began on two
demonstration projects, one between Washington and New York and
the other between New York and Boston. Together, these projects be-
came known as the Northeast Corridor Project. Initial enthusiastic re-
marks by the President suggested that improved service could shorten
the travel time between Washington and Boston to less than four
hours.4 9
The Department of Transportation entered into a contract with the
Penn Central Railroad, which owned and operated the trains and track
between New York and Washington, enabling that company to acquire
a fleet of electrified, self-propelled railroad cars capable of sustained
speeds of up to 150 mph. The contract provided for improvements to
the railbed, rails, bridges, and tunnels. The service became known as
the Penn Central Metroliner.
The project on the New York-Boston route had to be more limited
in scope because of the deplorable condition of both the tracks and the
finances of the New Haven Railroad, the operating carrier.50 Electri-
cally powered equipment could not be used because much of this route
was not electrified. A contract was made with United Aircraft Corpo-
ration to build and test several light train sets powered by aircraft tur-
46. LYON, upra note 6, at 256.
47. See 11968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2732.
48. 49 U.S.C. § 1631 (1976).
49. LYON, supra note 6, at 257. Railroad timetables from 1965 show that the trip was scheduled
to take eight hours and 40 minutes. Id
50. Id at 269.
1981l
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bine engines.5 An advanced suspension system was designed to
negotiate the numerous grade crossings and bridges, many of which
were fifty to seventy-five years old.
The high speeds envisioned by President Johnson were never at-
tained. The state of the tracks and roadbeds in both segments of the
Corridor prevented either route from realizing its potential. The Me-
troliner could make the New York-Washington trip in three hours with
stops."2 The running time for the turbotrains between Boston and New
York was three hours and forty-four minutes, with intermediate stops.
Subsequent experience revealed that even these schedules could not be
kept reliably, so the times were increased further.
B. Emergence of the Current Project
In September 1971, after the creation of Amtrak, the Secretary of
Transportation issued a report entitled "Recommendations for North-
east Corridor Transportation."53 The report's recommendations for the
1970's included implementing improved high-speed rail service with
nonstop running times of about two hours between New York and
Washington and two and three quarter hours between New York and
Boston. Total estimated cost, including vehicles, was 460 million dol-
lars.
A 1973 report by the Department of Transportation 54 increased the
estimated cost to 700 million dollars. A series of congressional acts,
which reorganized the bankrupt northeast railroads, directed the De-
partment to conduct further studies of the cost of implementing differ-
ent speed options. A 1975 report55 discussed six speed options and
their potential costs. Congress studied the different plans and opted, in
the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978,56 for one of the more ambitious
proposals. The Act appropriated 1.75 billion dollars for the project and
called for service, within five years, operating on schedules of at most
two hours and forty minutes between New York and Washington and
at most three hours and forty minutes between Boston and New York.
The electrically powered Metroliner equipment was chosen to serve the
entire system. This choice necessitated the extension of electrification
north from New Haven, Connecticut, where it had previously ended, to
Boston. Modification of existing electrification was to be undertaken to
promote greater efficiency. Further improvements of roadbeds, tracks,
bridges, signalling, grade crossings, fencing, and tunnels would enable
51. Id
52. Nonstop service, with a running time of two and one-half hours, was provided in 1969, but it
was discontinued after six months.
53. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, PROBLEMS IN THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR RAILWAY IM-
PROVEMENT PROJECT (CED 79-38) 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH-
EAST CORRIDOR].
54. Id
55. Id
56. Pub. L. No. 95-421, 92 Stat. 923 (1978).
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the faster speeds to be attained. Plans included improvements of pas-
senger stations as well.
As might have been expected, even this sum of money was inade-
quate to cover the costs of the project. Engineering difficulties arose at
every turn. In March 1979, a report by the Comptroller General57 con-
cluded that the project would not be completed within the allotted time
at the initial investment level. The report noted5" that Amtrak had al-
ready abandoned the prospect of some of the originally planned work.
Even the scaled-down goals would require funding of 2.4 billion dol-
lars. Completing all the originally scheduled work would require 2.6
billion dollars.
Congress reacted positively to the report in its most recent legisla-
tion, the Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980 (1980 Act).5 9 This
Act appropriated an additional 750 million dollars to the Northeast
Corridor project, bringing the total investment to 2.5 billion dollars.6 °
Senator Pell remarked on the floor that "this legislation will provide
the final push that is necessary to complete the project in the right way
and allow it to achieve the goals set for it in 1976.''61 Given the ten-
dency of such construction projects to run far ahead of their anticipated
costs, this enthusiasm appears premature. However, even if the time
goals are not met, the improvements should bring about a significantly
improved rail service in the Northeast Corridor. The Act provides for
the termination of the project in five years and the gradual decrease
and eventual elimination of the public subsidy.62
VI. EMERGING CORRIDORS
Perhaps an even more significant aspect of the 1980 Act is the sec-
tion which directs the Secretary of Transportation to identify other
markets which are ripe for development of high-speed corridors.63 In
complying with the 1980 Act, the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) prepared a study which ranked not only the thirteen named
markets but four others which were suggested by a congressional com-
mittee. 64
57. PROBLEMS IN THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR, supra note 53.
58. Id
59. Pub. L. No. 96-254, 94 Stat. 399 (1980) (codified at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-658 (West Supp.
1980)).
60. This amount falls slightly short of the $216 billion that the Comptroller General found was
needed to fulfill all the original goals, but it does reflect Congress' continued commitment to
the project.
61. 126 CONG. REC. S5,807 (daily ed. May 22, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Pell).
62. Amtrak is instructed to recover, in the Northeast Corridor, 55% of its operating costs in 1981,
75% in 1982 through 1986, and 100% thereafter.
63. Pub. L. No. 96-254, §§ 1001-1003, 94 Stat. 399 (1980) (codified at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-653
(West Supp. 1980)).
64. These extra routes are:
(1) Atlanta-Nashville
(2) Atlanta-Savannah
(3) Cleveland-Columbus
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The FRA report defines a "corridor" as
a route with large cities at each end of and/or along the route, where a
rail service level of at least three trains per day in each direction would
be capable of attracting substantial numbers of passengers. Normally,
such a route would contain at least one metropolitan area of at least
two million population and, more desirably, several such areas spaced
at distances of less than 200 miles.
6 5
The FRA ranked these corridors on the basis of the following factors:
potential ridership, operating costs and revenues, preliminary informa-
tion on the capital expenditures required, economic and demographic
growth projections, evidence of state committment to rail passenger
services, fuel efficiency, and adequacy of other modes of transportation
in the area served. Potential improvements in patronage were forecast
using a model which relied on a variety of different assumptions, in-
cluding various train frequencies, different costs of gasoline, and top
speeds of 79 mph or 110 mph. The route forecasting model is based
upon historical changes in demand observed, for example, when the
price or availability of gasoline changes or the frequency of service in-
creases.66 The following corridors emerged from the study as being the
most promising: 1. Los Angeles-San Diego; 2. Philadelphia-Atlantic
City; 3. New York-Buffalo; 4. Los Angeles-Las Vegas.
The Los Angeles-San Diego corridor, the most promising of all,
provides an interesting example of how the goals will be attained. Over
the 128-mile route is an area with a population of 89,417 per mile, the
highest density of any corridor studied. Upgrading the track and sig-
nalling to accommodate a top speed of 79 mph would cost 18.7 million
dollars in 1980 dollars. The additional trains would cost another 27
million dollars in 1980 dollars. Each dollar expended would, according
to the forecasting model, result in 10.93 more passenger-miles. Assum-
ing gasoline costs $1.40 a gallon (in 1980 dollars) in 1985, the resulting
improvement in patronage would be 41 percent over present use. Even
greater patronage improvements should be attained if top speeds of 110
mph can be reached or gasoline climbs to $2.50 per gallon by 1985.
The fuel savings generated by the investment are very expensive.
Assuming a gasoline price of $1.40 per gallon and an average speed of
79 mph, the project would require the expenditure of $7 for each gallon
of fuel saved. Other corridors would require even greater investment to
effect the same fuel savings. The FRA report concludes that "[by] any
(4) Philadelphia-Atlantic City.
65. FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, RAIL PASSENGER
CORRIDORS, EVALUATION METHOD AND RANKING 3 (July 1980) [hereinafter cited as RAIL
PASSENGER CORRIDORS, JULY EVALUATION].
66. The model is based upon historical changes in demand and forecasts of future increases.
Amtrak believes that increasing cost of fuel greatly affects demand for rail transportation, "as
former automobile travellers choose public transportation and find that the train service is
competitive with the automobile." FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, RAIL PASSENGER CORRIDORS, EVALUATION METHOD AND RANKING 20
(Feb. 1980) [hereinafter cited as RAIL PASSENGER CORRIDORS, FEBRUARY EVALUATION].
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measure the implementation of rail service in these corridors would be
very expensive and not very cost effective based on fuel conserva-
tion."' 67 Other rationales for the investment must be advanced.
VII. SUBSIDY
A. Subsidy in General
Amtrak's subsidy is very controversial, and many critics have advo-
cated the dismantling of much of the system. However, Amtrak's sub-
sidies must be considered against the background of subsidies to other
forms of transportation. Subsidy is a significant factor in our nation's
transportation system, almost all parts of which receive some govern-
ment revenue. For example, the federal government has spent billions
of dollars developing the interstate highway system. Much of this
money has been collected through "user charges" in the form of fuel
and vehicle taxes, which are dispersed to the states through the high-
way trust fund. Yet much of the money comes from general revenues.
Table 3,68 compiled from Federal Highway Administration statistics,
shows that in 1975 the Federal government disbursed about 2 billion
dollars more for highways than it received in user charges. The figure
for state and local governments was almost 7.5 billion dollars. By 1979
the total subsidy grew to 14.7 billion dollars. The National Transporta-
tion Policy Study Commission predicts that the total subsidy will grow
to 31 billion dollars by 1985 and 54 billion dollars by 2000, assuming
only moderate growth. The nation's highways are, and will probably
continue to be, the recipients of large subsidies. Many other forms of
transportation, particularly urban mass transit and air travel, also re-
ceive significant subsidies.
67. RAIL PASSENGER CORRIDORS, JULY EVALUATION, supra note 65, at 35 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
68. TABLE 3
1975 1979 1985* 2000*
Federal Disbursement -7,741 -10,545 -13,814 -19,519
Federal User Charge Revenues +5,699 +7,054 +5,636 +5,116
Net (subsidy)
State and Local Disbursement
State and Local User Revenue
Net (subsidy)
Total disbursements
Total User Charge Revenues
Net (subsidy)
projected
-2,042 -3,491 -8,178 -14,403
-20,412 -26,906 -36,436 51,461
+12,925 +15,725 +12,764 +11,877
-7,487 -11,181 -23,672 -39,877
-28,153 -37,451 -50,250 -70,980
+18,624 +22,719 +18,400 +16,700
-9,529 -14,672 -31,850 -54,280
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, Staitics 39
(1979); NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY STUDY COMI'N, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
POLICIES THROUGH THE YEAR 2000, FINAL REPORT 223-24 (1979).
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It could be argued that the government has allied itself with the
travel preferences of only a segment of the population. By subsidizing
an extensive highway system, the government has encouraged both
passengers and shippers of freight to abandon the rails for the high-
ways. Not only have federal, state, and local governments cultivated a
public travel preference, they gave the trucking industry a compara-
tively free ride by carefully maintaining the highways while leaving the
maintenance of the rails to the private railroads. As a result, the rails
fell into disrepair, causing an even greater exodus of freight and pas-
senger traffic.
This argument has been made by transportation authorities, many
of whom claim that the nation's transportation policy has unduly fa-
vored highway transportation to the detriment of rail transportation.
The result has been the diversion of passenger and all but the heaviest
freight onto the highways. Yet, by itself, any unfairness in this policy
does not sufficiently justify the rebuilding of the railroads. An effective
transportation system, such as the one presently existing in the United
States, need not be revamped unless there are compelling reasons for
doing so. As one author notes,69 it has been convincingly demonstrated
that the development of the railroads was not an indispensable part of
the nation's early industrial growth. The United States could have de-
veloped as it did by investing in canals instead. But no one suggests
that a nationwide system of canals be built in the interest of fairness.70
B. Energy as Justification
A persuasive rationale must be devised to justify the continued sub-
sidy of and further capital investment in the Amtrak system. The most
frequently cited rationale is probably the most controversial--energy
efficiency. Trains are an energy efficient mode of transportation, but
considerable disagreement exists as to their efficiency vis-a-vis other
modes of transportation. Perhaps the most exhaustive study of the effi-
ciency of passenger trains was performed for the Department of Trans-
portation in 1977 by a research team under R. K. Mittal. 71 The re-
searchers tested the energy intensity of several types of passenger trains
on the Buffalo-New York and Washington-New York routes.72 Energy
intensity was measured in British Thermal Units (BTU's) per seat-mile
and BTU's per passenger-mile."
69. F. MULVEY, AMTRAK: AN EXPERIMENT IN RAIL SERVICE 123 (1978) (prepared for National
Transportation Policy Study Comm'n, Rep. No. NTPSC/SR-78/02).
70. Id
71. R. MITrAL, ENERGY INTENSITY OF INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL (1977) (prepared for U.S.
Dep't of Transportation, Rep. No. DOT/RSPD/DPB/50-78-7) [hereinafter cited as MIT-
TAL].
72. These trains included diesel, gas turbine, and electric locomotives pulling various types and
numbers of cars. Self-propelled metroliner trains, which have no locomotives, were also
tested.
73. A seat-mile figure does not correlate operaing efficiency with actual observed load factors.
It is a calculation of efficiency based on the number of seats on a train which can be filled. A
[Vol. 8:334
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The researchers observed considerable variation in energy intensity
between different types of equipment, routes, track conditions, and
load factors. Some trains, for example the Canadian-built LRC (light
rail comfortable) and the metroliners, were very efficient. Others, par-
ticularly the gas turbine trains, proved to be inefficient. The research-
ers averaged the results and compared them with energy intensity
figures of automobiles, buses, and airplanes. The results are found in
Table 4.74 The actual load value the researchers used to calculate the
energy-intensity of automobile travel is surrounded by some contro-
versy. The authors assumed an average of 2.4 passengers per car, but
they noted that experts disagree about the accuracy of this figure.75
The results show that a passenger train is not remarkably fuel-effi-
cient. Although at full load it is more efficient than a fully loaded auto-
mobile and far more efficient than a plane, a train is far less efficient
than a bus. Amtrak trains generally travel at low load levels. At these
experienced load levels they are no more efficient than automobile
travel, and they are sometimes even less efficient.
The Mittal report did note7 6 that train performance might have
been influenced by the poor quality of the track. On the New York-
Buffalo route a train averages fifty-six accelerations and eighty deceler-
ations at an average allowable speed of 57.82 mph. Both the high
number of accelerations and decelerations and the low speed result
passenger-mile figure represents a calculation of efficiency based on observed loads. See
note 18 supra.
74.
TABLE 4
Mode B.T.U./S.M. Actual Load Factor*
Auto
Compact() 1100 1900(3 )
Average(2) 1600 2650
Bus 500 1100(4)
Air
Wide Body 3000 5500(8)
Current Fleet 3600 6500(8)
Train
Cross Country 1000 3500(5)
Metroliner 1000(7 ) 2000(6)
(1) mpg = 26.0
(2) mpg = 18.0
(3) Occupancy Rate = 2.4
(4) 45% Load Factor assumed
(5) Best estimate based upon the survey of current literature
(6) 50% Load Factor assumed
(7) Best estimate based upon TPC runs and survey of current literature
(8) Estimated under the current operating conditions
* Calculated on a nation-wide basis.
MITFAL, supra note 71, at 10-4.
75, Id at 9-19.
76. Id at 6-14.
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from the poor track conditions, contributing considerably to higher en-
ergy intensity values. Trains produce significantly lower energy inten-
sity figures at cruising mode.77 The potentially great efficiency at
cruising mode results from the structure of tracks and train wheels. A
train is a very heavy vehicle, but as it rolls along the curve of its steel
wheel touches very little of the flat surface of the steel rail. Less contact
results in less resistance and less friction than is generated by rubber
wheels on asphalt or concrete roads.78 Automobiles benefit from well-
maintained road surfaces, so they can presently rival or surpass trains
in efficiency. Although increased maintenance of track will produce
better train efficiency, improved automobile design will also produce a
more efficient automobile. Therefore, the potential fuel benefits result-
ing from a switch from automobiles to trains are, at best, ambiguous.
Different researchers have reached different conclusions about the
energy intensity of each of these modes. The results of several of these
studies are summarized in Table 5.79 Passenger trains fared well in
most of these studies. Most found train travel to be significantly more
efficient than automobile travel. In several, trains were found to rival
or even surpass intercity busses in efficiency. The Mittal report attrib-
uted the wide variation in results to various factors. These include the
use of different equipment, assumptions, and sources of data. °
The results of these studies point to a general conclusion. Passenger
train travel is an energy-efficient form of transportation. It is, however,
not a tremendous energy saver. It is clearly more efficient than air-
plane travel, and it is probably more efficient than at least some auto-
mobile travel.
One important point, which is not addressed directly by these stud-
ies, is choice of fuel. Intercity trains, unlike other forms of transporta-
tion, can use electricity as fuel. Airplanes cannot, of course, be
converted to electricity, and present technology has not developed an
electric car which can travel intercity distances. The conversion of the
nation's railroads from diesel to electric power could be one significant
precaution against a petroleum-short future. A petroleum-free future
might render electric passenger and freight trains important resources.
The difficulty is that only a small portion, about one percent, of the
nation's route-miles are electrified.8' Other nations have electrified
77. The figures at cruising mode, when trains are able to maintain a constant speed, range from
289 BTU/SM to 443 BTU/SM.
78. LYON, supra note 6, at 8.
79. See Table 5 on next page.
80. The various researchers used different types of equipment in each mode. They made differ-
ent assumptions about the length of trip, load factor, and frequency of operation. Some may
have used fuel consumption data for some modes which were supplied by the manufacturers.
Such data are usually conservative. On the other hand, actual fuel measurement data are
often high because they do not properly delineate trip energy from energy used in traction,
yard switching, and maintenance.
81. U.S. Dawdles While the Rest of the World Turns on, RAILWAY AGE, Feb. 23, 1976, at 28.
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large portions of their railroads;82 furthermore, most of these nations
have been engaged for many years in extensive electrification projects
on the remainder of the railroad lines that are not already electrified.
The United States, on the other hand, added only 100 miles of electri-
fied track between 1935 and 1975.
The reasons for these differences are well known.83 Some early
electrification projects were undertaken in the United States, but the
availability of cheap petroleum made diesel engines the logical substi-
tute for steam engines. In contrast to the United States, Europe and
Japan had to rebuild much of their railroads after World War II. The
higher cost of petroleum made electrification attractive.
The greatly increased cost of petroleum in the last decade has cre-
ated renewed interest in electrification in the United States. However,
the staggering capital investment needed to install the electrical cate-
nary, power stations, and other equipment cannot be borne by the
private railroads, many of which have been slipping in and out of
bankruptcy for years. The federal government, with its growing defi-
cits, is unlikely to provide the needed capital. Amtrak is, therefore, a
victim of the deteriorated condition of both the private and public sec-
tors of the economy. It is unfortunate that such a forward-looking con-
cept should be economically unfeasible.
C. Efficient Use of Space
The passenger train is a superbly efficient user of available space.
On one track a railroad can haul fifty thousand people per hour. 5
Transporting the same number in the same time on a highway requires
ten thousand cars, each carrying four passengers, travelling in four
lanes. Once the trains empty their passengers, they can be dispatched
to carry others. Automobiles clutter a city's streets and parking lots,
awaiting further use.
This advantage should not be underestimated. The extensive high-
way construction of the 1950's and 1960's brought superhighways to the
centers of our cities. This construction not only was very expensive but
also left extensive urban blight in its wake. Immense traffic jams have
become a constant urban problem. Highways are uniformly ugly, de-
tracting considerably from the aesthetic quality of the cities they serve.
The cloverleaf has become a national flower. Speculators buy up tracts
of downtown property and convert them to unsightly parking lots and
garages. The graceful downtown shopping areas of the past have dete-
riorated. The decentralization of the cities, resulting from increased
mobility, has left abandoned, derelict land in the center of cities, often
82. For example, 27% of the route-miles in the USSR, 46% in Japan, 99% in Switzerland, and 25-
60% in most other European nations are electrified. Id at 28.
83. Id
84. Catenary is the overhead wire which conducts electric power to electric trains.
85. LYoN, supra note 6, at 7.
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near the train stations. The freeway, the fast food store, the gas station,
and the suburban shopping mall have become national institutions, re-
placing the more aesthetically pleasing city centers of the past.
Although the universal acquisition of the private automobile was an
inevitable result of post-war prosperity, the abandonment of the inter-
city passenger train need not necessarily have occurred. In heavily
populated regions, encouragement of intercity train travel might have
made unnecessary at least some of the expensive and ugly highway
construction. The retention of train travel could have helped down-
town areas retain some of their vitality.
These concerns are, perhaps, rather speculative and romantic. It is
clear, however, that intercity train travel does prevent highway conges-
tion. Encouragement of train travel in fast-growing regions of the
country might obviate some highway construction and thus contribute
to the aesthetic beauty of these areas. In contrast, rural areas without
congestion problems have little to gain by increased train frequency.
D. Unfeasibility of Alternate Modes
Passenger trains provide the best form of transportation for snow-
bound regions of the country during the winter months. For example,
the "Empire Builder" train travels across northern regions of North
Dakota and Montana, where severe winters often ground airplanes and
make highway travel difficult or impossible. This environmental con-
sideration prompted Congress to retain this route,86 despite its heavy
losses.
Providing service to small communities has been a national policy
for many years. The federal government subsidizes airlines to serve
small communities that would othewise have no air service. Continua-
tion of these subsidies is justified on a service-for-the-sake-of-service
rationale. The same rationale would apply to some Amtrak routes,
which serve small cities without other forms of public transportation.
However, Amtrak is a clumsy vehicle to use in fulfilling national trans-
portation goals because so many cities are served by only middle-of-
the-night trains. Eliminating one middle-of-the-night train per day
would hardly cut these communities off from the rest of the country.
E. Safety
Train travel is a very safe mode of transportation. However, all
common carriers have good safety records, and most passengers seem
willing to risk the slightly greater danger involved in air travel in order
to avoid the extra time required by train travel. Although train travel
permits much higher speeds than can be safely attained on a highway,
86. 1979 Amtrak Hearings, supra note 25, at 34.
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the poor quality of track in most areas limits speed. Safety considera-
tions do not, by themselves, justify Amtrak's subsidy.
F. Potential for Use in Fuel Emergencies
During the oil shortages of 1973 and 1979, Amtrak's patronage in-
creased substantially.87 Amtrak's role in times of severe fuel emergen-
cies is limited by the small size of its fleet, which will not permit
accommodation of even one percent of all intercity trips. The likeli-
hood of a short-term fuel emergency does not justify the purchase of
enough equipment to create a true backup system. The possibility of a
permanent fuel emergency has not created sufficient interest in an obvi-
ous alternative, electric trains. By the time such an emergency arises,
other solutions may have already emerged.
VIII. DISCUSSION
It is quite clear that energy considerations alone cannot be used to
justify the continued Amtrak subsidy or future capital investment in
high-speed corridors. The advantage of passenger rail service lies in its
efficient use of space and its ability to provide service directly to popu-
lation centers. As such, it provides an excellent alternative to air travel,
which is very energy intensive and which serves airports located in pe-
ripheral areas. As the cost of petroleum increases, the energy intensive-
ness of air travel will probably cause its cost to increase dramatically,
thus reducing its competitive edge. High-speed rail corridors could be-
come popular carriers for travel over short distances. Government en-
couragement of this alternative is desirable because the increased
highway congestion and the highway construction that will be needed
if the public increases its driving will only detract from the quality of
the environment. Thus, a case can be made for the development of
high-speed rail transportation, at least in some markets. The service
would be developed as a substitute for air and automobile traffic. Seri-
ous study should be made to determine which of the short-distance
markets would respond to high-speed rail service. The potential bene-
fits of this service are not of compelling necessity, so it should only be
developed where losses will only be minimal. The benefits are, how-
ever, real. Short-distance passenger rail service has the potential to be-
come a significant part of the nation's transportation scheme.
Development should be encouraged in those markets which can best
profit from it.
Subsidy of long-distance rail service is far less justifiable. In regions
where severe winters make other forms of travel infeasible, such serv-
ice offers an assistance to the only viable mode of transportation.
Many of these routes do help fulfill the national transporation goal of
87. RAIL PASSENGER CORRIDORS, FEBRUARY EVALUATION, supra note 66, at 25.
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providing service to small communities which cannot generate enough
demand for a profitable business venture. However, these routes must
be restructured so that these communities are served by trains which
arrive during the day. Instead of offering one Chicago-Seattle train, for
example, Amtrak should split the route into a series of day trains. Each
train would begin its journey in the morning and reach its destination
in the evening. This plan would, however, require the operation of
quite a few more trains and the expenditure of considerably more
money. This restructuring would allow Amtrak to better fulfill the na-
tional policy of offering service to small communities.
Much of the loss that Amtrak has sustained since its inception is
unjustifiable. Service which does not seek to accomplish any of the
goals enumerated herein benefits no one except the person who prefers
to ride the train. The expenditure of enormous sums of money only to
indulge the preference of those who wish to ride a train accomplishes
no social good at an enormous cost to the public. Many of Amtrak's
long distance routes are examples of the narrow focus of the subsidies.
These routes provide no positive service to many of the communities
through which they travel. They save little energy, they contribute
nothing to the beauty of the environment, and they do not help any
snow-bound traveller get out of his isolated town. Little social good is
accomplished in catering to the travel preference of a passenger who
might choose otherwise if he had to pay the full cost of the trip.
IX. CONCLUSION
The failure of Amtrak to be a profitable corporation has undoubt-
edly resulted from the low demand for the service it provides. People
prefer to travel by car and plane. This preference has clearly been cul-
tivated by the extensive highway construction in which the nation has
engaged for many years. But the nation should not engage in a massive
rebuilding of passenger railroads just in the name of fairness. Compel-
ling reasons must be advanced for such an action. Trains are energy-
efficient, but they are not enough so to justify even much of the present
subsidy. The possibility that a large-scale electrification will soon take
place is remote. Electrification provides great flexibility and thus
makes sense in planning for a future in which the supply of fossil fuel is
in doubt. It is, however, unlikely that the needed capital will be forth-
coming. Other policy considerations do justify at least some of the sub-
sidy to Amtrak. Nonetheless, passenger trains make the most sense in
crowded urban areas. Such trains can provide service to downtown
areas, thus enhancing the vitality of downtowns, minimizing urban
sprawl, and relieving congestion on the highways. Amtrak's future lies
in short-distance, high-speed rail corridors. Whether the Balkanization
of Amtrak need result will depend upon whether the travelling public
sees fit to patronize the long-distance routes. Ever-increasing petro-
leum prices may force significant numbers of people out of planes and
19811
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back on the tracks again. But that scenario is a more distant possibility.
It would make little sense to dismantle the system. It makes much
sense to restructure it to permit it to provide service where it is most
beneficial to the public.
Theodore C. Forrence, J*
* B.A., Duke University, 1978; J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 1981.
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